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Abstract 
The UK left the EU Integrated Electricity Market on 31/12/20 and with it access to 
Single Day Ahead Coupling that clears local and cross-border trades jointly – 
interconnectors are implicitly auctioned. The new the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement requires a replacement “Multi-region loose volume coupling” to be 
introduced before April 2022. Until then, interconnector capacity is allocated by an 
explicit day ahead auction before the EU auction with nomination after the EU 
results are known. The paper measures the risks posed by taking positions in each 
market separately and the resulting costs of uncoupling of GB’s interconnector trade. 
It compares four forecasts of price differences under two sequencing of markets and 
explicit auction, determining traders’ risk premia for each. The current timing leads to 
lower mistakes on the direction of flows, although higher profit volatility, arguing to 
retain the current timing. Competitive traders locking in their positions after the 
explicit auction (overstating costs as subsequent trading out of unprofitable positions 
is ignored) limit the total loss of interconnector revenue from uncoupling to €31 
million/yr., and the social cost of uncoupling is €28 million/yr., considerably below 
earlier estimates in the literature. 
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Abstract 
The UK left the EU Integrated Electricity Market on 31/12/20 and with it access to Day Ahead 
implicit auctions. Before new “Multi-region loose volume coupling” are designed and 
introduced, trade over interconnectors are replaced by an explicit day ahead auction before the 
EU auction with nomination after the EU results are known. We ask what this implies for the 
efficiency of GB’s interconnector trade. The paper compares four forecasts of price differences 
under two sequencing of markets and auction, and determines traders’ risk premia for each, 
concluding that reversing the current timing and accelerating the move to volume coupling 
would be highly desirable. Under the determined risk premia, we estimate the total loss in the 
congestion revenue from uncoupling is €38 million/yr, while the social cost of uncoupling is 




On January 1st, the UK ended the transition period of exiting the European Union and 
started trading under the new Free Trade Agreement (FTA,3 the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement).4 Until that date, Great Britain traded electricity under the EU Integrated 
Electricity Market (IEM) arrangements that were designed to facilitate electricity trade over 
interconnectors joining different countries by reducing risk. Northern Ireland (NI) and the 
Republic of Ireland (RoI) continue trading electricity in the integrated Single Electricity 
Market.  NI is more closely aligned under its Withdrawal Agreement with the EU Member 
State, the RoI, and is treated as such under the new FTA. The consequences of Brexit on the 
British electricity sector are well documented (e.g. Aurora Energy Research, 2016; Vivid 
Economics; Froggatt et al., 2017; Mathieu et al., 2018; Pollitt, 2017; Pollitt and Chyong, 
2017).  
This paper estimates quantitatively the impact of the change in trading arrangements 
over interconnectors to the Continent on the efficiency of trading, the revenues of their 
owners and of traders, and specifically, the social cost of uncoupling. By comparing different 
possible timings of auctions for interconnector capacity and domestic demand the paper 
considers whether relatively rapid reforms to the order of these markets would improve 
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efficiency. There is a deadline of March 2022 to implement new “loose coupling” trading 
arrangements, and this paper argues for additional changes to improve their efficiency. 
While GB remained in the IEM the interconnectors were subject to the Single Day 
Ahead Coupling (SDAC) arrangements. These are governed by Article 37(5) of Commission 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing guidelines on Capacity Allocation 
and Congestion Management (‘CACM Regulation’, see ENTSO-E 2019). Under SDAC at 
the day-ahead stage all coupled members of the IEM submit bids and offers to the 
EUPHEMIA EU-wide Day Ahead Market (DAM) auction platform. The EUPHEMIA 
algorithm finds the consumer and producer surplus maximising solution for generation and 
demand offered into the auction, subject to meeting transmission constraints, including the 
capacity of interconnectors. If in the solution an interconnector is unconstrained, prices at 
each end will be the same (adjusted for any losses over the interconnector). If the 
interconnector capacity constraint binds, prices will diverge, and the price difference times 
the volume flowed will be the congestion revenue received by the interconnector owners. 
Guo and Newbery (2020) demonstrated that the GB Carbon Price Support (CPS, an 
extra carbon tax on generation fuels) distorted trade over interconnectors, and calculated the 
impacts on prices in GB and its neighbours, as well as the deadweight loss and the impact on 
interconnector revenue. This paper ignores the complexity of asymmetric carbon taxation, 
and looks forward to a time when carbon prices are aligned across trading countries, in order 
to focus just on estimating the cost of uncoupling. It does, however, employ the same 
methodology to estimate the social cost of uncoupling. 
Newbery et al. (2016) demonstrated that SDAC delivered substantial financial 
benefits of about €1 billion to the EU as a whole (substantially more if balancing markets 
were integrated as well). Uncoupling the UK from the EU is therefore potentially costly, 
perhaps €60 million/yr, assuming the same loss per MWh as for the countries in Newbery et 
al. (2016, Table 1). Lockwood et al. (2017) estimated the economic benefit of GB integrating 
with the Continent to be up to £1bn/year, representing the economic loss when the market 
integration between the two was undone. Geske et al. (2020) estimated that a hard Elexcit 
(i.e. uncoupling with no substitute trading arrangements) might eventually cost up to 
€300m/yr for Great Britain (with producers gaining and consumers losing €860/yr).5 These 
earlier estimates suggest that the costs of uncoupling can be substantial, but fortunately the 
FTA that the UK has negotiated with the EU, when implemented, should substantially reduce 
these costs. This paper estimates the immediate costs for one interconnector (that to France, 
Interconnexion France Angleterre - IFA) and assesses possible improvements to the final 
implementation of the FTA. Appendix A gives results for the other interconnectors to France 
and the Netherlands. The aim is to err on the high side of the possible costs, and demonstrate 
that they are considerably lower than some of the earlier more doom-laden predictions. 
Under the new FTA, the System Operators (SOs) in GB and those in countries 
interconnected to GB (France, Netherlands, France and the SEM) need to develop new 
trading arrangements based on “Multi-region loose volume coupling”, with a timetable of 
 
5 The benefit of market integration in other electricity markets can also be substantial, as seen in the 
PJM’s market area (Mansur and White, 2012), between Denmark and Germany (Meeus, 2011), and 
between GB and the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM, 2011). 
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entry into operation within 15 months (see Appendix B). Meanwhile the default position is as 
set out in various announcements by the Government and regulators, discussed below. Meeus 
and Schittekatte (2020) describe the evolution and various forms of market coupling within 
the EU that put these alternatives in context. 
Market coupling is important not just for ensuring efficient use of the interconnectors, 
but also in facilitating the creation of contracts to reduce the risk of trading. Generators need 
to sell their output on the most favourable terms, balancing risk and reward. Their risks are 
physical (outages, or for variable renewables, resource – wind or sun – conditions) and 
financial (prices of inputs and outputs). Physical risks can be insured against (for plant) 
and/or predicted and self-hedged. Financial risks can similarly be hedged on various markets 
and/or self-hedged by signing up customers and integrating into retailing.  
The question addressed in this paper is how hedging is affected by trading over 
interconnectors with and without market coupling and what that implies for efficiency, 
incomes and social benefits. Section 2 sets out the methods for estimating these impacts. 
Section 3 describes the ways of reducing risk, section 4 describes the consequences of Brexit 
for the interim electricity trading arrangements, section 5 sets out the methods, data sources 
and results for estimating the cost of risk, and section 6 examines the case for strengthening 
the FTA’s proposed ‘Multi-region loose volume coupling’ to include firm Financial 
Transmission Rights. Section 7 concludes with policy recommendations. 
 
2. The impact on uncoupling on revenues and social cost 
Provided all externalities are internalised through charges and subsidies (as was 
intended for carbon under the EU ETS and the Renewables Directives) and if electricity 
wholesale markets are workably competitive (as they are in GB), then market prices would 
correctly measure the social cost of generation. We make this assumption, recognising that 
further corrections might be needed, as set out in Guo and Newbery (2020). Assuming, as is 
standard, that in the short-run demand is inelastic, the impact of uncoupling is to reduce the 
willingness of traders to pay for interconnector capacity and as a result to nominate lower 
amounts to trade. Lower prices for capacity and lower trade volumes reduce interconnector 
congestion revenue, as well as reducing the social benefits of trading.  
The social cost of uncoupling is the increase in generation cost caused by reducing the 
extent to which exports from the lower cost country are reduced. If the coupled price 
differences in any hour were Δp, and after uncoupling in that hour are ΔP, and if the 
reduction in trade is Δm, the increase in social cost is ½(Δp+ ΔP)Δm, where Δm may have to 
take account of a change in direction of trade. Δp is observed, and ΔP can be estimated using 
the methodology and results of Guo and Newbery (2020). The key element in these 
calculations is to estimate Δm by examining the response of traders to uncoupling and its 
subsequent impact on prices and congestion revenues. 
The problem of forecasting the optimal trading position is complicated by the 
existence of Flows Against Price Difference (FAPD), i.e. cases where the traders make an 
incorrect judgement of the sign of the price difference and hence on the direction of trade. 
Consider a simple example in which traders make on average correct forecasts of price 
differences, and trade on the basis of unbiased forecast price differences. If the interconnector 
has capacity C = 2 GW, with expected price differences, d, (GB-FR) of €4/, €3, €1, -€4, (all 
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per MW capacity for an hour, i.e. per MWh), all equally probable, The expected price 
difference, Ed = €1/MWh. If traders also nominate on the basis that imports are always 
profitable, they might expect to receive in the four states €8k, €6k, €2k and -€8k, averaging to 
€2k. This is what they would have been willing to bid, Ed.EC = €2k. 
If they believe that they can choose not to nominate unprofitable trades the option to 
import is worth €2/MWh and their expected revenues in the four states is be €8k, €6k, €2k 
and €0, on average €4k. Clearly if they pay that amount and then fail to nominate in the 
correct direction they earn €2k but have paid €4k and make a loss. In this paper, erring on the 
side of overestimating costs, the assumption is that actual nominations are based on the 
original forecasts of price differences. This will influence the value they attach to and are 
willing to bid for capacity, which we address by adding a “risk” premium to their unbiased 
price forecast. In practice sometimes it will be less costly not to nominate unprofitable trades, 
and even if they do, there are further opportunities to unwind unprofitable positions in intra-
day markets up to real time dispatch. However, compared to the situation under coupling, the 
outcome would have been €8k, €6k, €2k and +€8k with an average of €6k, three times their 
average outcome from always nominating to meet buy and sell commitments. Again, the 
social cost of uncoupling will tend to be overstated. 
 
3. Risk, contracting and hedging 
The cost of the risks facing agents will depend very much on their portfolio of assets, 
commitments, and financial resources, with the larger and better endowed better able to take 
a riskier position, or requiring a lower risk premium to accept that risk. It may be helpful to 
consider three types of agents – a generator without any captive customers (i.e. not an 
integrated utility); a retailer without any generation assets, and a trader with no physical 
assets but a large and diverse trading portfolio. Each will face different risks, but generator 
and retailer risks are complementary in that high prices benefit generators but harm retailers 
(at least to the extent that they have signed a contract to supply customers at a fixed price for 
a period), while conversely low prices benefit retailers but harm generators. This risk 
complementarity provides the motivation to sign contracts. 
Traders typically do not have offsetting risks (although many act as the trading arm of 
often vertically integrated utilities) but they specialise in expertise, volume, financial strength 
and the ability to diversify across commodity classes and countries. Given that electricity 
prices typically follow gas prices, electricity price risk can be reasonably well hedged by a 
gas contract. When carbon prices become significant, a combined gas (or coal) and carbon 
contract improves the hedge (Guo and Castagneto Gissey, 2019). 
The classic contract to handle price risk is the Contract for Difference (CfD), 
characterised by a quantity, M, a strike price, s, and the reference price p, (e.g. the Day Ahead 
Market – DAM – price). Suppose that s is such that each party is content to buy/sell the 
contract without any additional side payment. The seller of the CfD then receives (s-p).M and 
the buyer pays (s-p).M, which can be either positive or negative. In effect the seller has sold 
forward M at the strike price s, which the buyer has bought, but each transacts in the relevant 
market at price p for the M. A two-sided CfD is an obligation, with the holder obligated to 
pay the other party when it is in the money for the other party. In contrast, an option allows 
the holder to receive payments when in the money but to avoid payments in adverse states. 
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One-sided CfDs have the form of an option, and can either pay out if they market price rises 
above a strike price, or if it falls below a strike price. The one-way up-side CfD, often termed 
a Reliability Option, is a way of hedging consumers against price spikes, and auctioning them 
can provide a capacity payment, paying generators to deliver in stress periods when the price 
spikes, e.g. in the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland.  
 
3.1 Trading and hedging over interconnectors 
Single Day Ahead Coupling solved one critical problem – that of inefficient trading on 
interconnectors, but did not in itself solve the other problem of trading across borders, that of 
price risk between different countries. However, integrating markets considerably reduced 
risk, as argued below. Creating a single local price for both trading between and within 
countries reduced the number of transactions needed to sell abroad, increased the size and 
therefore liquidity of the market, and overall reduced transaction costs. The planned future 
replacement arrangements will no doubt be an improvement on the default post-transition 
arrangements but will still lead to two sequential day-ahead markets– one closing in GB 
before the main auction clears on the Continent. 
DAM prices are volatile, as is their difference across interconnectors, so trading over 
the interconnector is risky and needs hedging contracts. Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) 
entitle (but do not oblige unless otherwise specified) the holder to nominate flows over the 
interconnector or sell the rights. At the Day Ahead stage, (D-1), if the price difference across 
the interconnector reverses sign, it is unprofitable to nominate the PTR in the original 
direction, in which case the holder will not make use of the right to deliver. The value of the 
PTR as an option is then the sum of the positive hourly price differences. 
 Long-term (LT) PTRs are auctioned before delivery for periods of months, quarters, 
seasons and years, and can be traded, but under SDAC they become Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTRs) at the Day Ahead (D-1) stage that entitle the holder to the congestion revenue. 
EU Member States can also issue LT FTRs either as options or obligations, but under the 
EU’s Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA) Guideline6 they cannot issue both PTRs and FTRs 
at the same bidding zone border (FCA, Art. 31(6)).7 Under the SDAC, GB only uses PTRs 
with the Continent, but the two interconnectors with the SEM issue FTR options (SEM, 
2015). Options can provide a partial hedge against cross-border price differences, but only for 
hours in which the flow is in the direction of the FTR. 
To solve the problem of a complete hedge across borders, the transmission rights 
would need to be obligations, not options, and in that way would correspond to the standard 
CfD. There are considerable advantages in choosing obligations rather than options for 
hedging, as we shall argue below.8 They bring more competition to bear in each market as 
 
6 Under Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 
7 Art 31(6) states “The allocation of physical transmission rights and FTRs — options in parallel at 
the same bidding zone border is not allowed.” 
8 EFET (European Federation of Energy Traders) has argued strongly for obligations rather than 
options (e.g. in ENTSO-E’s Market ESC, 3/12/2015) and there is a long history of academic papers 
arguing for such obligations (e.g. O’Neill et al., 2002). 
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they allow netting of trades on interconnectors,9 so that more FTRs can be issued than the 
physical capacity of the interconnector, provided they are offset by countertrades. Options are 
necessarily limited in volume to the capacity of the interconnector. However, almost 
universally in Europe the prevalent choice is for options, and as our interest is primarily on 
trade with the IEM, the relevant LT capacity contract is a PTR option. For concreteness, we 
consider the IFA interconnector between GB and France and consider the other two 
interconnectors in Appendix A. 
3.2 The difference between forward and spot electricity markets 
Forward markets allow traders to buy and sell standardised contracts for a future period, 
typically a month, quarter, season or year. Within a country the standard contract is a 
financial contract - a two-side CfD, and as such is an obligation for the buyer facing a price 
below the strike price to pay the seller, and the seller facing a price above the strike price to 
make up the difference to the buyer. The typical and most liquid contract is for baseload, 
although larger markets may be able to support peak and less often, off-peak contracts. Most 
consumers have a daily pattern of demand that varies and will need to supplement baseload 
contracts with additional buying and selling of hourly amounts in the “spot” market, of which 
the most liquid is the DAM, with responses to later information (outages, updated wind 
forecasts, etc.) in Intraday Markets (IDMs), and finally in the Balancing or Real-time Market. 
The liquidity of these spot markets is therefore critical for the efficient working of an 
unbundled and liberalised electricity market. For example, in the SEM during the first quarter 
of 2020 the DAM accounted for 78% of the market value, followed (in temporal sequence) 
by IDM1 with 5.83%, IDM2 with 2.82%, IDM3 with 0.84%, IDC (the continuous IDM) with 
0.24%, and finally, the Balancing Market with 12.30% (SEM, 2020). 
Trading across interconnectors in forward markets has similarities (typically baseload 
for varying durations) but important differences, in that the GB-FR PTR is an option, not an 
obligation. Holding an equal volume of PTRs in both directions gives the full congestion 
value of the interconnector, which may be useful for a trader but is not helpful for a 
generator, and is probably the main reason by traders dominate interconnector trade. 
Appendix D gives examples of how these contracts work under SDAC. 
4. The consequences of Brexit 
From 1 Jan 2021, GB and the SEM are no longer part of the SDAC, and therefore will not be 
able to participate in the EUPHEMIA EU-wide auction platform. According to the UK 
Government (31/12/20):10 
The UK government has concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the EU to come 
into effect following the transition period, ending 31 December 2020. This agreement provides 
a framework for future electricity trading across interconnectors between the UK and the EU. 
The agreed model of trading will take time to develop and will not be in place for 1 January 
2021. Previously developed alternative arrangements will need to be implemented in the 
interim, which will endure until the agreed trading model can be put in place. 
 
9 If a seller is obligated to move M MW from A to B, then that capacity M can be resold from B to A, 





In Northern Ireland, the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol to the Withdrawal 
Agreement provides the basis for the continued operation of the Single Electricity Market after 
1 January 2021. The UK government is supporting the Department for the Economy in 
Northern Ireland to implement the Single Electricity Market provisions at Article 9 and Annex 4 
of the Protocol, which apply key elements of European energy law in Northern Ireland, which 
are largely devolved, to enable the effective operation of the Single Electricity Market across 
the island of Ireland. 
 From 1 January 2021 cross-border flows across electricity interconnectors will no 
longer be governed by EU legislation which provides for efficient trade and cross-border 
cooperation in operating the electricity system. In accordance with the agreed UK-EU FTA, a 
new model of efficient electricity trading across interconnectors will be developed, including 
for trade between Great Britain and the Single Electricity Market. These arrangements will not 
be in place for 1 January 2021. 
 
The island of Ireland is in a special position under the Withdrawal Agreement, which 
maintains the integrity of its Single Electricity Market (SEM). The SEM Committee 
published an updated information note regarding a ‘no deal’ Brexit on 27 November 2019:11  
  
From 1 January 2021, regardless of the outcome of the future partnership negotiations 
between the EU and the UK, the SEM will continue to operate as an all-island market. Trade 
between the SEM and the market in Great Britain, through the Moyle and EWIC 
interconnectors, will also continue, although this trade may be less efficient, as it will no 
longer be possible for some platforms that currently operate under EU rules to continue to do 
so.”  
 
Nemo Link (to France) already has in place a set of Non-IEM Access Rules that have been 
approved and will be operational from 1st January 2021. Nordpool states that 
From 31 December 2020 Nord Pool's day-ahead auction has a new gate closure time of 
09:50 GMT with results available no later than 10:00 GMT. In the island of Ireland, the SEM-
GB intraday auctions (IDA1 & IDA2) continue to operate with shared order books between 
power exchanges, offering implicit capacity between the island of Ireland and GB. 
Ofgem published its guidance as follows: 
GB’s electricity interconnectors to Continental Europe will switch from implicit to 
explicit trading arrangements. This is when transmission capacity on the interconnector is 
auctioned to the market separately from electrical energy, and the switch in arrangements will 
happen at the end of the transition period. 
For GB’s interconnectors to the Irish electricity market, market capacity will be 
allocated via implicit intraday auctions. We do not expect to receive updated Access Rules 
ahead of the end of the transition period. 
The individual interconnectors have published the day-ahead timings, and for IFA 
(Interconnexion France Angleterre, the 2,000 MW link to France): 
 
Day Ahead implicit auctions will cease, to be replaced by an explicit day ahead auction, 
hosted on the JAO platform for both IFA and IFA2. 






DA Nomination Window 12:05-14:00 CET 
UIOSI - Unused LT (Long term) capacity will be re-allocated in the Day Ahead explicit auction, 
and hence will be paid out at the clearing price of this auction. 
 
Britned (the 1,000 MW link to the Netherlands) gives the following timeline shown in 
Figure 1, which shows that explicit capacity auctions will be staggered throughout the 
morning, starting with the BritNed interconnector, followed by IFA, IFA2 and finally Nemo 
Link. Auction bids are submitted before the GB DAM results are known, but the decision 
whether to nominate trades over the interconnectors takes place after both the GB and EU 
DAM prices are announced (the SDAC prices are announced before 13:00 CET). 
 
 
Figure 1 Overview of GB Day Ahead Auctions 
 
The rules for explicit auctions are set out on the Joint Allocation Office (JAO) 
website12 as Rules for Daily Capacity Allocation on the GB-Belgian Border (August 2019) 
“where GB is not part of the EU Internal Energy Market for Day Ahead timescales.” This 
note will consider two auction designs – the default JAO design (whose bidding rules are set 
out in Appendix C) and its likely replacement of Multi-region loose volume coupling, but 
with the addition of firm FTRs. The relevant features of the JAO auction are summarised 
below. 
 
4.1 The JAO explicit auction 
The key point is that actors submit hourly bids for willingness to pay to use the 
interconnector in a given direction. It is implicitly a measure of the price difference across the 
link, with no explicit prices at each end, as in the SDAC auction. The interconnector can sell 
capacity in both directions, and unless everyone is convinced that flows will always be in one 
direction, there will be appetite for acquiring capacity in both directions (particularly from 
traders) at a positive price (one of which may be very low, but an option likely still has some 
 
12 At https://www.jao.eu/support/resourcecenter/overview  
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value). Bids are added up in each direction until full capacity is reached in that direction, and 
the direction that gives the highest congestion revenue wins, and determines the direction in 
that hour to provide to the SDAC DAM. We can now distinguish a number of additional 
hourly prices, with notation as follows:  
pCh  price in the SDAC DAM in country C (e.g. FR) in hour h; 
PGBh the GB DAM price, clearing after the GB auction but before the SDAC 
auction (capital P indicates an uncoupled price, lower case in the SDAC);  
(sGB, PGB) CfDs signed forward in GB at strike price sGB and settled at the GB DAM 
daily average price (hence no subscript h), similarly (sFR, pFR) in France; 
VFtGh The GB D-1 auction price in hour h for the option on capacity on IFA from FR 
to GB, exercised if in expectation PGBh > pFRh, in the set of hours h*; 
As in Appendix D, consider a French generator choosing between selling in GB against 
selling hedged with a CfD in FR (the least risky option open to the French generator). The 
basic unhedged starting position for selling in GB (with no CfDs or PTRs bought forward) is 
a) Generator buys IFA at D-1 from FR to GB at VFtGh for the set of hours h* expected to 
be profitable, sells in GB DAM for these hours and submits corresponding FPNs13 in 
GB, and at D-1 offers the remaining h** hours into SDAC and informs the French 
System Operator that he will generate in all hours. Finally, after all prices are known, 
nominates those trades in hours h*ʹ that are revealed to be profitable. 
Following this strategy, the French generator expects to sell for the h* hours in GB. In other 
hours h** when exporting is considered unprofitable, she offers and receives pFR from FR 
SDAC. Income is ∑h* (PGBh - VFtGh) + ∑h** pFRh.14 If there are (random) forecasting errors, 
εh, in the later DAM price differences, then for h = h*, VFtGh = PGBh – pFRh - r + εh, where r is 
a risk premium designed to rule out unprofitable nominations. Income is ∑h* (pFRh + r - εh) in 
these hours while in the remaining hours it is ∑h** pFRh. Total income is ∑h* (r + εh)+ ∑h 
pFRh. The risk exposure is effectively to the FR SDAC DAM prices, with some additional 
uncertainty about errors introduced by uncoupling IFA. The remaining cases address various 
elements in this risk viewed from the day-ahead and month-ahead stage (or even earlier with 
suitable contracts). 
Hedging different steps (and in all cases informing the French System Operator that 
she will generate) 
b) As a) but also hedge FR risk with FR selling a FR CfD (sFR, pFR), leading to income 
∑h* (r + εh )+ ∑h sFR, leaving only forecasting risk exposure in trading hours at D-1, 
but again only selling (cautiously) for h* hours in GB. The only difference with the 
reference hedged FR position is ∑h* (r + εh), where r is chosen to make this sum 
 
13 Final Physical Notification to the System Operator that he will deliver into GB. 
14 This is a simplification, in that if markets reveal the FPN is unprofitable in some of the h* hours, 
either the generator will pay an imbalance charge in GB or will nominate an unprofitable trade, either 
way earning less. Empirically this is dealt with later by setting a risk premium that discourages 
bidding that leads to such losses, at the cost of a lower utilisation. 
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small when averaged over many days. Its determination is an empirical issue for the 
empirical section. 
c) As b) but also hedge by selling GB CfD (sGB, PGB), and hence committing to selling in 
all hours in GB. The generator imports into GB with nominated capacity on IFA in 
hours h* (and later submits FPNs in GB for these deliveries) and sells in GB DAM; 
and at D-1 offers all hours into SDAC. The GB settlement exposure is only covered in 
profitable trading hours, so that there is an additional risk of ∑h** (PGBh - sGB) to add 
to ∑h* (r + εh) + ∑h sFR, or additional risk ∑h** PGBh + ∑h* (r + εh) compared to the 
reference hedged FR position. As such it looks relatively unattractive, and may be the 
major cost of uncoupling, in reducing the extent of sellers in the GB market; 
effectively creating a tariff barrier to imports that might reduce GB prices. 
d) As c) but generator buys a baseload PTR from FR to GB for vFtG, nominates 
profitable trades, sells in GB DAM and submits corresponding FPN in GB in hours 
h*, and at D-1 offers all hours into SDAC. This is the same as c) except for trading 
profit ∑h* (VFtGh – vFtG), which does not add additional risk, but might reduce overall 
uncertainty viewed at M-1. 
All of these involve varying degrees of price risk exposure, compared to just trading with 
CfDs in France, raising the natural question of how these risks might be avoided. Clearly, the 
more quickly the proposed “Multi-region loose volume coupling” required by the FTA is 
agreed and introduced, the better. Meanwhile the interim market structure described in Figure 
1 will be used to guide estimates of the cost of uncoupling. 
 
5. Empirical estimates on loss in trading 
The loss in interconnector efficiency has a number of elements. The most important 
social cost is that the interconnector is under-used as bidders will be cautious in paying for 
capacity if there is a risk that it would turn out not be profitable to nominate once the DAM 
prices are known, given that selling in GB requires a prior commitment to deliver there. One 
of the key risks is that the interconnector will be importing from what turns out to be a high 
price zone into a low cost zone, and the resulting Flow Against Price Difference (FAPD) will 
cause losses that need to be addressed by more cautious bidding, adding a risk premium to 
the forecast price difference. 
The second impact is that bidders will undervalue (on average) capacity because of 
their risk aversion, and hence the congestion revenue paid by traders to interconnector owners 
will be lower. This reduced congestion revenue will have additional costs if it discourages 
potentially profitable investment in future interconnectors. Clearly, the value of 
interconnectors like IFA will be enhanced the lower is the perceived risk of trading explicitly. 
The main risk is bidding incorrect price differences – specifically paying more than it is 
worth if going in the predicted direction and, if the flow is in the opposite direction to that 
predicted, losing the capacity price bid as the flow will not be nominated. 
The most obvious way to reduce this risk is to improve forecasting accuracy, and the 
larger traders are doubtless devoting resources to do just that, so they can offer more 
competitive pricing for trading for generators and suppliers. If traders efficiently arbitrage 
cross-border price differences, domestic players can concentrate on their local markets 
`11 
 
without the worry that they are losing out on more attractive cross-border trades. The cost to 
interconnector owners of inefficient arbitrage is considerable: a €1 of discount to fair value if 
the interconnector is available for 8,000+ hrs/yr is worth €16+ million/yr on the 2,000 MW 
IFA (where fair value is measured avoiding subsequent FAPDs). 
The rest of this section describes the methods for forecasting the price differences 
between GB and France, compares the accuracy of different forecast rules, and estimates 
trader’s risk premium under different trading rules after Brexit, using the best forecast 
method identified, but locking in trade expectations in the face of revealed FAPDs. This then 
allows a (possibly over-stated) calculation of the social cost of uncoupling and the loss to 
interconnectors. No doubt sophisticated traders will be able to improve on these estimates, 
but whether they pass that on in lower margins will depend on the extent and vigor of 
competition in the explicit auction. 
4.1 Forecasting methods 
With explicit auctions, traders need to forecast the cross-border price difference before 
submitting bids. If neither the GB nor the EU day-ahead (DA) hourly prices are known when 
the auction bids are entered, the traders will need to forecast both GB and FR prices, or 
effectively, the GB-FR price difference, to inform the bid and direction. We compare the 
three most common econometric methods with a naïve method for forecasting the price 
differences between the two countries.15 Consider first just forecasting the DA hourly prices 
for FR (and GB if necessary, separately), and then take the difference.  
            The Naïve Forecasting Method (NFM) sets the forecast of DA hourly prices equal to 
prices 24 hours earlier where both days are weekdays (thus for Tuesday-Friday), but where at 
least one day is a weekend (i.e. for Saturday-Monday) the forecast is the price 168 (= 24*7) 
hours earlier: 
𝑝𝑡,ℎ = 𝑝𝑡−1,ℎ + 𝑢𝑡,ℎ, for Tuesday-Friday 
𝑝𝑡,ℎ = 𝑝𝑡−7,ℎ + 𝑢𝑡,ℎ, for Saturday-Monday 
(1) 
where 𝑝𝑡,ℎ denotes the DA price (for FR or GB) for hour ℎ on day 𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡,ℎ are forecast 
errors. 
Fezzi and Mosetti (2020) find that Simple Linear Regressions (SLR) with only two 
parameters can perform unexpectedly well if estimated on extremely short samples. The 
second method is their SLR: 
𝑝𝑡,ℎ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑞𝑡,ℎ + 𝑢𝑡,ℎ, (2) 
where 𝑞𝑡,ℎ is the DA forecast of electricity demand.  
Autoregressive models with exogenous variables (ARX) are widely used for 
electricity spot price forecasting. The ARX model takes the form 
 
15 Machine learning methods such as Artificial Neutral Networks and Support Vector Machines are 
also attempted, but their forecast errors are much greater than the proposed econometric methods. 
Therefore, in this article, we no longer consider machine learning methods as options. For more 
literature on spot market forecasting, see for example, Keles et al. (2016), Mirakyan et al. (2017), 
Marcjasz et al. (2020). 
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𝑝𝑡,ℎ = 𝛽0,ℎ + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,ℎ𝑝𝑡−𝑖,ℎ + ∑ 𝜃𝑗,ℎ𝑋𝑗,𝑡,ℎ + 𝑢𝑡,ℎ𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1 , (3) 
where 𝑚 represents the AR lags, 𝑋𝑗,𝑡,ℎ contains exogenous variables including DA forecasts 
of domestic and foreign (including GB, France, France, Germany, and The Netherlands) 
electricity demand and renewable generation of domestic and foreign countries, coal and gas 
prices, EUA prices, as well as day-of-week dummy variables.  
Vector autoregressive models with exogenous variables (VARX) go further to capture 
relationships of prices among different hours of the day. A VARX model takes the form 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛤0,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖,ℎ𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛩𝑋𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1 + 𝑈𝑡, (4) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is a 24×1 vector of hourly DA prices for day 𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 is a vector containing all 
exogenous variables. To substantially reduce the number of unknown coefficients, the 
matrices 𝛤𝑖’s are diagonal so only prices for the same hours in previous days have predictive 
power for today’s price. Similarly, exogenous variables with hourly frequency, such as the 
DA forecasts of demand and renewable generation, only have predictive power on today’s 
prices for the corresponding hour, meaning that their coefficient matrices are also diagonal.  
Equations (1) - (4) provide forecasts of DA prices, which are then used to forecast the 
price difference. One can test whether it is more efficient to directly forecast the price 
difference, in which case, 𝑝𝑡,ℎ in (1) - (3), and 𝑃𝑡 in (4) are replaced by the price differences 
between GB and FR.  
If (as is not at the moment the case) the GB DA market were cleared before the 
auction, it would only be necessary to forecast the FR price, and then predict the price 
difference between GB and FR. In this case, GB’s market clearing prices are included in 
regressions (2)-(4) as predictive variables.16 If that improves efficiency and reduces the social 
loss of uncoupling a change in market and auction timing might be relatively simple to 
introduce. Examining this scenario therefore offers the prospect of a relatively simple 
immediate improvement to trading arrangements. 
4.2 Data 
GB’s DA electricity prices in Euros come from the Nord Pool, and the DA electricity prices 
for FR come from the ENTSO-E transparency platform. The day-ahead forecast on 
renewable generation and demand for GB and FR are collected from the ENTSO-E 
transparency platform. Because GB and FR are heavily interconnected with France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, we also include forecasts of the Belgian, German, and Dutch 
demand and renewable generation as predictive variables (also from the ENTSO-E 
transparent platform).17 Where data are at 15-minute frequency they are aggregated to hourly 
frequency. Missing data are replaced by the out-turn values (e.g. for generation). 
 
16 In this case forecasting the French price and forecasting the GB-FR price difference are equivalent, 
as the GB price enters to the right-hand-side of regressions.  
17 Germany used to have a single price zone with Luxemburg and Austria, but in August 2019 Austria 
separated from Germany. In our analysis, the forecast on DE’s demand and renewable generation is 
always the forecast for the DE-AT-LU price zone --- for periods before August 2019, we use the 
forecast for the DE-AT-LU market; while for periods after August 2019, we sum up the forecasts for 
DE-LU and AT markets.  
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The ICE Rotterdam Coal Futures price is taken as a proxy for the daily wholesale coal 
price and the GB National Balancing Point (NBP) gas price is taken as the spot price for 
natural gas (an excellent proxy for EU gas prices). Both prices are converted to €/MWhth, 
using the conversion factors from Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2019.18 
Finally, the daily auction price for CO2 - the EU Allowance price - comes from Bloomberg. 
When calculating the congestion revenue between GB and FR, we also need the day-ahead 
interconnector capacity as well as the day-ahead scheduled flow (between 31st Jan 2019 and 
30th Jan 2020), collected from the Nord Pool.  
4.3 Forecast process 
Unexpected events such as nuclear outages and extremely cold winter days can cause 
extreme prices driven by high demand and/or low supply. Extreme prices cannot be predicted 
by conventional econometric methods. Instead, probability models are preferred (Hagfors et 
al., 2016). We leave this to future research. Furthermore, we find that including extreme 
prices as predictive variables can distort the values of estimated coefficients, resulting in poor 
forecast accuracy (not reported). The problem is avoided by setting upper and lower bounds 
for hourly DA prices entering the regressions. The bounds are set at four times the standard 
deviation of the hourly DA prices. Any values greater than that deviation from the sample 
mean is replaced by the upper or lower bound. 
            Although our analysis mostly focuses on IFA which was coupled in 2014, later we 
will replicate the analysis on BritNed and Nemo. As Nemo was commissioned on 31st Jan 
2019, for all three interconnectors we collect data from 31st Jan 2018 to 30th Jan 2020. Data 
for the first 365 days are used for training and the data for the second 365 days are used for 
out-of-sample validation. The out-of-sample forecast is conducted recursively. For example, 
the forecast of the DA prices on 31st Jan 2019 is based on the training result using data 
between 31st Jan 2018 and 30th Jan 2019. The forecast of the DA price on 1st Feb 2019 is 
based on the training result using data between 1st Feb 2018 and 31st Jan 2019, and so on.  
4.4 Error measures 
Conventional error measures include the Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) and Mean Squared 
Errors (MSE). Denoting the forecast of price difference as ?̂?𝑡,ℎ and the market clearing price 





















In our case, 𝑇 = 365 is the total number of days for out-of-sample validation and 𝐻 = 24 is 





MAE and MSE estimate the accuracy of forecasts, whereas a social planner might be 
more interested in the loss from imperfect forecast. Under perfect forecasting or when IFA is 
coupled, in the DA market the capacity will be efficiently used and the congestion revenue 
(i.e. the product between the price difference and the flow) is maximized. However, when the 
market is uncoupled, the efficiency of IFA will depend on the forecast accuracy of DA prices 
(or price differences), and the congestion revenue will not be maximized. Our next three error 
measures are therefore measuring losses from imperfect forecasts.  
The next error measure is therefore the percentage of Flows Against Price Difference 
(FAPD), the standard ACER metric of interconnector inefficiency. It measures the percentage 
of time that the interconnector flow goes from the higher-price market to the lower-price 
market, or equivalently, that the sign of the predicted price difference differs from that of the 









This will represent a failure to use the interconnector in the correct direction.  
 
4.5 Forecasting results 
We consider three different scenarios. In the first two scenarios (the current arrangement), 
neither GB’s nor the French DA hourly prices are known when bids are made to the explicit 
interconnector auction. Scenario 1A directly forecasts the price difference between GB and 
FR so that in (1)-(4), 𝑝𝑡,ℎ and 𝑃𝑡 denote price differences instead of DA prices. In (2), 𝑞𝑡,ℎ 
becomes a vector of two variables, namely the DA forecast of GB and FR electricity demand. 
Scenario 1B forecasts GB and FR DA prices separately and then takes their difference. 
In Scenario 2, a relatively simple and quick reform, the GB DA hourly market is run 
and clears before the interconnector auction. In this scenario, forecasting the price difference 
based on the revealed GB price would deliver the same result as forecasting the French DA 
price based on the revealed GB price and then taking the price difference.  
Table 1 presents the error measures of forecast results. Among the four proposed 
econometric methods, ARX substantially outperforms others, followed by VARX. On the 
other hand, regardless of the forecast method, Scenario 2 always has the lowest MAE and 
MSE, while Scenario 1A or 1B has the lowest FAPD. Under the market timings in Scenario 
2, traders make better forecasts of relative values, while in Scenario 1A and 1B, they make 
better forecasts of the sign of the price difference. This implies that there is no 
unambiguously preferred ordering of market timings, which should be determined by the 
timing that minimizes social loss. That loss will depend on the relative importance of the loss 
of FAPD against improved willingness to trade from improved price forecasts. 
Traders are assumed able to estimate any impact the subsequent trade flows have on 
the GB DAM or that any forecast errors on trade flows are small compared to the market 
served by the GB DAM and so do not impact the DAM price. The social cost estimates are 
probably higher than would be the case if traders were to adjust their decisions in subsequent 
intra-day markets that open after the DAM prices are known, and which offer the prospect of 
changing the nominated flows on the interconnectors. 
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1A,B 7.33 149.48 11.46% 
2 6.24 78.46 16.92% 
SLR 
1A 6.96 93.97 9.92% 
1B 8.33 125.94 12.23% 
2 5.88 70.60 13.78% 
ARX 
1A 5.49 66.45 9.78% 
1B 5.50 66.55 9.90% 
2 3.89 33.81 11.92% 
VARX 
1A 5.71 71.90 11.42% 
1B 5.72 70.94 11.26% 
2 4.38 41.53 13.55% 
Note: In Scenario 1A, both GB and FR DA prices are unknown, 
and we directly forecast the price difference; In Scenario 1B, both 
GB and FR DA prices are unknown, we separately estimate the 
DA prices and then take the difference; In Scenario 2, the GB DA 
price is revealed before the auction, and we directly forecast the 
price difference using the GB DA price as a predictor.  
 
4.7 Risks from the traders’ perspective 
Once interconnectors are uncoupled, the immediate concern is the impact forecasting risk 
would have on the mean and variance of traders’ revenue from buying interconnector 
capacity in the explicit auction and then buying and selling in the relevant DAMs, as that will 
affect their willingness to buy capacity and hence on interconnector revenue. For that we can 
simulate the effect of submitting bids into the explicit auction based on the forecast of price 
difference, less a risk premium, and calculate the quarterly and/or annual profit from trading, 
assuming that the expected price differences determine actual trade directions (regardless of 
subsequent information from the SDAC DAM prices).  
            Algebraically, for a particular hour, denote the risk premium as r > 0, the 
transmission capacity as C, a marginal trader’s forecast of the price difference as ?̂?, and the 
actual price difference as 𝑑. The volume that marginal traders would purchase in the explicit 
market is  
?̂? = {
𝐶,  if ?̂? > 𝑟 
−𝐶, if − ?̂? > 𝑟
0, otherwise
,                                                                                             (5) 









[𝑑 − (?̂? − 𝑟)] × ?̂?,   if ?̂? > 𝑟 and 𝑑 > 0
[𝑑 − (?̂? + 𝑟)] × ?̂?,   if − ?̂? > 𝑟 and 𝑑 < 0
−(?̂? − 𝑟) × ?̂?,   if 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(?̂?) ≠ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑) and ?̂? > 𝑟
−(?̂? + 𝑟) × ?̂?,   if 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(?̂?) ≠ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑑) and − ?̂? > 𝑟
0,   otherwise
.                                 (6) 
𝛱 = 0 when −𝑟 < ?̂? < 𝑟, marginal traders will not participate in the explicit auction.19  
            For example, suppose traders’ risk premium is €1/MWh. If the forecast of GB-FR 
price difference is €10/MWh, they would bid €9/MWh in the explicit auction for GB 
importing from FR. After the DA market clears, if the clearing price difference is negative or 
greater than €9/MWh, they lose. Otherwise, they make a profit at the expense of the 
interconnector. The profit (and losses) from trading (for each hour) is added to the cumulative 
balance of gains and losses and periodically checked. If they hardly ever make a cumulative 
loss then rerun the calculations with a risk premium of €0.5/MWh, with bids of €9.5/MWh in 
the explicit auction, and so on. Eventually, when the traders’ cumulative profit is close to 
zero, the corresponding risk premium is taken as the risk premium of the marginal traders. 
           From formula (6), the traders’ loss from trading mainly comes from two elements – 
forecasting the wrong sign of the price difference or overestimating the price difference (and 
these are why the risk premium is essential). Figure 3 presents a scatter plot between the 
actual GB-FR price difference and the forecast values using ARX under Scenario 2. The dots 
distribute evenly around the 45-degree line. In Figure 3, only a small proportion of dots are 
within the second and fourth quadrants, indicating that most of our forecasts are of the right 
sign. When the sign of our forecast is wrong, the associated loss is (mostly) is small thanks to 
the risk premium. Put another way, the trader’s loss mainly comes from overestimating the 
price difference (instead of forecasting a wrong sign). 
 
Figure 3 Actual vs. Forecast Price Differences using ARX under Scenario 3 
            Given the results in Table 1, we consider the marginal trader using ARX as the 
forecast method. We also consider the three different scenarios described above. Table 2 
 
19 Although marginal traders do not participate, less risk-averse infra-marginal traders (or those with 
more optimistic forecasts) may, resulting in some flows in this case. They would on average make 




presents the annual profit for traders between 31st Jan 2019 and 30th Jan 2020, under different 
risk premia. It suggests that when the GB DA price is revealed before the explicit auction 
(Scenario 2), the risk premium that allows marginal traders to make just above zero annual 
profit from IFA DA trading is €1.32/MWh, considerably below the other scenario values. 
However, under the current trading rule (i.e., Scenarios 1A and 1B), the risk premia are 
greater, lying within €2.35/MWh and €2.39/MWh. Given our assumption that competition 
among traders is sufficiently intense to drive down the risk premium until profits are 
negligible, traders’ should be indifferent to the order of the timing of the explicit auction and 
the GB DAM. 
   Table 2 Annual profit under different risk premia trading on IFA (in million €) 
 Scenario 1A Scenario 1B Scenario 2 
Risk premia (€/MWh) 2.35 2.39 1.32 
Annual Profit (€ million) 0.10 0.06 0.09 
 
It seems plausible that traders would frequently update their risk premium based on 
the trading result during the previous, for example, three months. Figure 4 presents the 
trader’s dynamic risk premium based on the trading results during the past 91 days.20 The 91-
day risk premia in Scenarios 1A and 1B becomes extremely high in the second half of 2019, 
which is not the case in Scenario 2. The reason is that the trader is able to make much better 
forecasts (in MAE and MSE) knowing the GB price, resulting in more profitable trading and 
hence smaller risk premia.  
 
Figure 4 91-day Risk Premia on IFA 
 
20 Without the loss of generality, we have removed the date with extreme prices (i.e. 8th June 2019, 
when the FR, BE, NL price reached negative almost for the entire day) in Figures 5 and 6, as well as 
the corresponding figures in the Appendix. 
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Finally, Figure 6 shows the 91-day rolling standard deviations of the traders’ hourly 
profit, when the risk premium is set at €1.32/MWh (i.e. when a marginal trader’s annual 
profit from trading is just above zero in Scenario 2). The standard deviation of hourly profit 
can be interpreted as a proxy for the volatility of trading, and risk aversive traders dislike 
volatile markets. Figure 6 confirms that in Scenario 2, the trader enjoys not only lower risk 
premium, but also a much lower volatility of hourly profit, making reordering the timing of 
the explicit auction and the GB DAM even more attempting (from traders’ perspective).  
 
  
Figure 6 91-day-rolling Standard Deviations of Hourly Profit from Trading on IFA, under 
ARX Forecasts 
4.8 Trading on BritNed and Nemo  
GB is also interconnected with The Netherlands through BritNed and Belgium through 
Nemo. In Appendix A we replicate Section 4.7 on BritNed and Nemo for the same period, 
finding that the risk premia for BritNed is smaller than IFA, while the risk premia for Nemo 
is greater than IFA, probably because Nemo is the youngest interconnector among the three 
(commissioned in 31st Jan 2019), and is less stable during the first several months of 
operation. The results from all three interconnectors tell a same story: reordering the timing 
of the explicit auction and the GB DAM is desirable from traders’ perspective, because it 
reduces the risk premium for the marginal trader and reduces the volatility of hourly profit.  
4.8 The cost of uncoupling 
The inefficiency resulting from uncoupling can be measured as the percentage of time that an 
interconnector is Inefficiently Used (IU) when it should be: 












where the numerator is the total number of hours that the interconnector reaches its capacity 
limit, 𝐶𝑡,ℎ denotes the capacity of the interconnector, and  1(∙) is an indicator function. ?̂? 
follows formula (5) when |?̂?| > 𝑟, but when −𝑟 <  ?̂? < 𝑟, we assume, perhaps 
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optimistically, given the losses they will incur,  the interconnector flow is 𝐶 ∗ ?̂?/𝑟, purchased 
by infra-marginal traders.  
The Commercial Costs of Uncoupling (CCU) are the loss in congestion revenue 
relative to the total congestion revenue under market coupling due to imperfect forecasts.  
Given observed net import under market coupling (𝑉𝑡,ℎ) and the estimated net import when 
the market is uncoupled (?̂?𝑡,ℎ from formula (5)), the CCU is 
CCU=𝑉𝑡,ℎ ∙ 𝑑𝑡,ℎ − ?̂?𝑡,ℎ ∙ ?̃?𝑡,ℎ, 
where ?̃?𝑡,ℎ is an estimate of the price difference when the market is uncoupled. Uncoupling 
may result in a change in flows, which further change the DAM prices. Given the estimates 
of the marginal slope of the electricity supply curves in Guo and Newbery (2020), we can 
further estimate the price difference between GB and FR when IFA is uncoupled. 
Algebraically, given the slope of the supply curve as 𝜃𝐺𝐵 and 𝜃𝐹𝑅,
 21 ?̃?𝑡,ℎ can be expressed as:  
?̃?𝑡,ℎ = 𝑑𝑡,ℎ + (𝜃𝐺𝐵 + 𝜃𝐹𝑅) ∙ (𝑉𝑡,ℎ − ?̂?𝑡,ℎ). 
Finally, the Social Cost of Uncoupling (SCU) is the increase in generation cost caused 




(𝑑𝑡,ℎ + ?̃?𝑡,ℎ) ∙ (𝑉𝑡,ℎ − ?̂?𝑡,ℎ)|. 
The SCU is estimated under the standard assumption that the short-run demand is inelastic. 
Provided all externalities are internalised through charges and subsidies (as was intended for 
carbon under the EU ETS and the Renewables Directives) and that electricity wholesale 
markets are workably competitive (as they are in GB), market prices would correctly measure 
the social cost of generation. Further corrections might be needed if carbon prices are not 
aligned across interconnectors, see Guo and Newbery (2020).  
            Table 3 lists the IU, CCU, and SCU from uncoupling IFA, BritNed and Nemo in the 
three scenarios, with bold indicating the least cost options (which, agreeably, are the same for 
each interconnector). The total commercial cost of uncoupling is about €29 m./yr under the 
current trading rule, while if the GB DAM price is revealed before the explicit auction, the 
commercial cost rises to €38 m./yr. The estimated social cost of uncoupling is about €26 
m./yr under the current trading rule, but can be as high as €34 m./yr if the GD DAM prices 
were revealed before the explicit auction. The higher commercial and social costs of 
uncoupling in Scenario 2 are due to the high FAPD (see Table 2). That is reassuring as there 
is no conflict between commercial and social objectives and that the current trading rule does 
not need to be changed. In any scenarios, our (over-) estimated cost of uncoupling is lower 
than that estimated by Lockwood et al. (2017) and Geske et al. (2020), but compatible with 
Newbery et al. (2016). The social costs are lower than the commercial costs as the 
 
21 Guo and Newbery (2020) estimated the marginal slope of electricity supply curves for GB, FR and 
NL (€0.881/GW, €1.817/GW, and €2/GW, respectively). As BE is heavily interconnected with 
France, we assume the slope of the BE supply curve to be €1.817/GW, same as FR. 
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commercial costs are evaluated at the equilibrium price and the social cost includes some 
infra-marginal values (the average of the initial and final price differences).  
Table 3 Rates of inefficient use, commercial congestion income and social cost 






1A 7.7% 16.6 13.7 
1B 8.1% 16.9 14.1 
2 9.3% 21.9 18.2 
BritNed 
1A 9.2% 8.4 8.6 
1B 9.1% 8.8 8.9 
2 8.7% 10.4 10.3 
Nemo 
1A 8.0% 4.1 3.3 
1B 8.0% 4.4 3.6 
2 10.6% 6.0 5.2 
 1A 8.3% 29.1 25.6 
Total 1B 8.4% 30.1 26.6 
 2 9.5% 38.3 33.7 
5. The case for ‘Multi-region loose volume coupling’ and firm FTRs 
The problem with the JAO auction is that the DAM prices remain implicit and only their 
difference is revealed. The obvious solution is to make these implied market prices actual 
market clearing prices by combining the explicit auction with the GB DAM into which 
buyers and sellers trading within GB can also offer, as well as those wishing to trade across 
borders. This is the required solution for the SO’s to design and implement before April 2022 
(see Appendix B). Effectively it mimics some of the advantages of the SDAC coupling but in 
this case coupling the GB DAM with one side of interconnector trade. In addition, and as part 
of the market redesign, creating a new auction market in forward FTRs that are obligations, 
not options, would seem desirable. That is not required by the FTA but nor is it prevented. 
Under this design there is a new hourly price for FR and prices for the new FTRs: 
PFRh the hourly price in FR set in the GB D-1 auction. The GB auction price is the DAM 
PGBh;  
fFtG the price of the forward FTR, paying PGBh – PFRh in every hour on the day (possible 
negative in some hours, requiring payment from the holder, as with a CfD); 
Now consider the case of a French generator wishing to hedge is output and suppose 
that it is profitable to generate in every hour on the day. Selling to a consumer in FR just 
needs a French CfD, but selling to a consumer in GB needs a CfD in GB (sGB, PGB) and an 
FTR from FR to GB.  
 
A French generator’s profit in each case from generating per MWh in hour h for the day is 
a) Selling to FR consumer hedged with CfD: (sFR – c); 
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b) Selling to GB consumer with GB CfD, buying a forward FTR from FR to GB, and 
offering all output into the D-1GB auction: profit =1/H ∑h [(sGB – PGBh) + (PGBh – 
PFRh) + PFRh)] – fFtG – c.  
 
Arbitrage between case e) and case f) requires 
sFR = sGB – fFtB. 
The combination of the two-sided GB auction and the introduction of firm FTRs removes all 
price risk of trading in forward markets. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
The UK’s departure from the EU and the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021 has 
created a hiatus between the ending of market coupling and the introduction of ‘Multi-region 
loose volume coupling’ required by the FTA. That will take some time to design and 
introduce, and meanwhile we have established that trade is likely to be less efficient. Our 
estimate suggests that the loss in congestion revenue from uncoupling is about €29 m./yr, or 
about 12% of the total congestion revenue under market coupling. The social cost of 
uncoupling is slightly lower at about €26 m./yr. 
As traders will now be exposed to the risk that their ex ante market position and 
interconnector purchases may lock them into unprofitable trades, their rational response is 
modelled as attaching a risk premium to their forecasts of price differences, and so they will 
discount their bids in the explicit interconnector auction. Under the present timings in which 
the GB DAM closes after the explicit auction, traders have to forecast the price difference 
between the two separate DAMs. Trading on IFA is risky as inflexible French nuclear 
generation and highly weather-sensitive demand make prices (and flow directions) harder to 
predict, so the bid premium is quite high at over €2/MWh. The initial bid premium on Nemo 
could be as high as €3/MWh, but improved market linking as time passed after 
commissioning reduced the premium to just over €1/MWh. The less volatile market in the 
Netherlands and longer period since commissioning results in a lower bid premium on 
BritNed of under €1/MWh).  
The most immediate (and reassuring) policy implication is that there is no need to 
move the DAM to clear before the explicit auctions open. The case for accelerating the move 
to loose coupling is to reduce the material losses in congestion revenue and in the social 
benefits of trading. These costs are smaller than other estimates, and probably overstated as 
they do not take account of re-nominating and unwinding domestic positions, and/or re-
trading in subsequent intraday markets. These actions might improve efficiency, particularly 
as they affect the full and efficient use of the interconnector and reduce the costs of 
uncoupling. Improved interconnector profitability would avoid the discouragement to 
building further interconnectors, of which many are at the design stage and provide an 
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ARX  Autoregressive models with exogenous variables 
CfD  Contract for Difference 
DA  Day ahead 
DAM  Day-ahead market 
D-1  the day before (the delivery date) 
EUPHEMIA Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm 
FAPD  Flows Against Price Difference 
FTA Free Trade Agreement (the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU 
that came into force on 1 Jan 2021, see Appendix B) 
FTR Financial Transmission Right 
IDM Intraday Markets 
IEM  Integrated Electricity Market 
IFA  Interconnexion France Angleterre 
JAO  Joint Allocation Office (see Appendix C) 
LCR  Loss in Congestion Revenue  
LT  Long term 
MAE  Mean Squared Error 
MSE  Mean Absolute Error  
NFM  Naïve Forecasting Method 
PTR  Physical Transmission Right 
SDAC  Single Day-ahead coupling 
SEM  Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland 
SLR  Single Linear Regression 
SO  System Operator 




Appendix A Replicating Section 4.7 on IFA and BritNed 
Regressions (1) - (4) are applied to the price difference between GB and The Netherlands 
(NL), as well as the price difference between GB and Belgium (BE). Both results suggest 
ARX to be the forecast method with the highest forecast accuracy. Table A.1 reports error 
measures of the forecast GB-NL and GB-BE price differences using ARX, for Scenarios 1A 
(forecasting differences), 1B (forecasting each price separately) and 2 (where the GB DAM 
closes before the explicit auction). As in Table 1, the MAE and MSE for the forecast price 
differences in Scenario 2 outperforms those under Scenarios 1A and 1B, but, and critically, 
the FAPD is smaller in Scenario 1A.  









1A 4.48 47.63 10.48% 
1B 4.48 47.95 10.81% 
2 3.59 29.98 12.59% 
Nemo 
(GB-BE) 
1A 6.61 247.47 8.49% 
1B 6.57 247.75 8.87% 
2 5.49 199.47 11.98% 
 
Table A2 reports the annual profit for a marginal trader trading at the explicit auction for 
BritNed and Nemo, under different risk premia. The minimum risk premia for a trader to 
make non-zero profit in Scenario 1A (which table 3 shows leads to the lowest commercial 
and social cost)  are €0.85/MWh and €3.19/MWh for BritNed and Nemo, respectively.  
Table A2 Annual profit under different risk premia (in million €), IFA and BritNed 
  Scenario 1A  Scenario 1B Scenario 2 
BritNed 
(GB-NL) 
Risk premia (€/MWh) 0.85 0.75 0.24 
Annual Profit (€ million) 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Nemo 
(GB-NL) 
Risk premia (€/MWh) 3.19 3.08 2.33 
Annual Profit (€ million) 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 
Figure A1 plots the dynamic risk premium for a marginal trader based on the trading results 
during the past 91 days, when trading in the BritNed and Nemo explicit auction. For both 
interconnectors, the risk premium in Scenario 2 is almost always lower than those under 
Scenarios 1A and 2B. The risk premium for BritNed’s traders was temporarily below zero, 
mostly because during those periods the predicted price difference was lower than the actual 
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price difference, making it profitable with a zero risk premium --- the risk premia have to be 




Figure A1 91-day Risk Premium, BritNed (upper) and Nemo (lower) 
 
Finally, Figure A2 presents the 91-day-rolling standard deviations of hourly profit from 
trading in IFA and BritNed, where the risk premia are €1.32/MWh and €0.24/MWh, 
respectively. Similar to the Nemo example, we find the volatility of trading is much smaller 
under Scenario 2 than Scenarios 1A and 1B. Again, the sudden inclines (on 8th June 2019) 






Figure A2 91-day-rolling Standard Deviations of Hourly Profit from Trading, BritNed 





TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, OF THE OTHER 
PART  at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agreements-reached-between-the-united-
kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-and-the-european-union  
 
p784: ANNEX ENER-4: ALLOCATION OF ELECTRICITY INTERCONNECTOR CAPACITY AT 
THE DAY-AHEAD MARKET TIMEFRAME  
 
Part 1  
1. The new procedure for the allocation of capacity on electricity interconnectors at the day-ahead 
market timeframe shall be based on the concept of “Multi-region loose volume coupling”.  
 
The overall objective of the new procedure shall be to maximise the benefits of trade.  
As the first step in developing the new procedure, the Parties shall ensure that transmission system 
operators prepare outline proposals and a cost-benefit analysis.  
 
2. Multi-region loose volume coupling shall involve the development of a market coupling function to 
determine the net energy positions (implicit allocation) between:  
(a) bidding zones established in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which are directly 
connected to the United Kingdom by an electricity interconnector; and  
(b) the United Kingdom.  
3. The net energy positions over electricity interconnectors shall be calculated via an implicit 
allocation process by applying a specific algorithm to:  
(a) commercial bids and offers for the day-ahead market timeframe from the bidding zones 
established in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/943 which are directly connected to the United 
Kingdom by an electricity interconnector;  
(b) commercial bids and offers for the day-ahead market timeframe from relevant day-ahead markets 
in the United Kingdom;  
(c) network capacity data and system capabilities determined in accordance with the procedures 
agreed between transmission system operators; and  
(d) data on expected commercial flows of electricity interconnections between bidding zones 
connected to the United Kingdom and other bidding zones in the Union, as determined by Union 
transmission system operators using robust methodologies.  
 
This process shall be compatible with the specific characteristics of direct current electricity 
interconnectors, including losses and ramping requirements.  
 
4. The market coupling function shall:  
(a) produce results sufficiently in advance of the operation of the Parties’ respective day-ahead 




Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/122222) in order that such results may be used as inputs into the 
processes which determine the results in those markets;  
(b) produce results which are reliable and repeatable;  
(c) be a specific process to link the distinct and separate day-ahead markets in the Union and the 
United Kingdom; in particular, this means that the specific algorithm shall be distinct and separate 
from that used in single day-ahead coupling established in accordance with Regulation (EU) 
2015/1222 and, in respect of commercial bids and offers of the Union, only have access to those from 
bidding zones which are directly connected to the United Kingdom by an electricity interconnector.  
5. The calculated net energy positions shall be published following validation and verification. If the 
market coupling function is unable either to operate or to produce a result, electricity interconnector 
capacity shall be allocated by a fall-back process, and market participants shall be notified that the 
fall-back process will apply.  
6. The costs of developing and implementing the technical procedures shall be equally shared between 
the relevant United Kingdom transmission system operators or other entities, on the one side, and 
relevant Union transmission system operators or other entities, on the other side, unless the 
Specialised Committee on Energy decides otherwise.  
 
Part 2  
The timeline for the implementation of this Annex shall be from the entry into force of this 
Agreement, as follows:  
 
(a) within 3 months – cost benefit analysis and outline of proposals for technical procedures;  
 
(b) within 10 months – proposal for technical procedures;  
 





22 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity 
allocation and congestion management (OJ EU L 197, 25.7.2015, p. 24). 
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Appendix C JAO bidding rules 
 
Article 27 Bids submission 
1. The Registered Participant shall submit a Bid or set of Bids to the Allocation Platform in 
accordance with following requirements: 
(a) it shall be submitted electronically using the Auction Tool …  
(c) it shall identify the direction for which the Bid is submitted; 
(d) it shall state the Bid Price, which shall be different for each Bid of the same Registered 
Participant unless otherwise provided for in the Information System Rules, exclusive of taxes 
and levies, in Euros per MW for one hour of the Product Period, i.e. Euro/MW and hour, 
expressed to a maximum of two (2) decimal places, and equal to or greater than zero; … 
(e) it shall state the Bid Quantity in full MW which must be expressed without decimals, 
minimum amount of a single Bid is one (1) MW. 
2. The Registered Participant may modify its previously registered Bid or set of Bids at any 
time during the Pre-bidding and/or Bidding Period including its cancellation. In case the Bid 
has been modified only the last valid modification of the Bid or set of Bids shall be taken into 
account for the provisional Auction results determination. … 
Article 32 Auction Results Determination 
1. After the expiration of the Bidding Period for an Auction and the Credit Limit verification 
pursuant to Article 31, the Allocation Platform shall determine the Auction results and allocate 
the Transmission Rights in accordance with this Article. 
2. The Auction results determination shall include the following: 
(a) determination of the total quantity of the allocated Transmission Rights per direction; 
(b) identification of winning Bids to be fully or partially satisfied; and 
(c) determination of the Marginal Price per direction. 
3. The Allocation Platform shall determine the Auction results using an optimization function 
aiming at maximization of the sum of the Registered Participants’ surplus and the Congestion 
Income generated by the winning Bids while respecting the constraints of the optimization 
function in form of relevant Offered Capacities. The Allocation Platform shall publish 
additional explanatory information on the optimization function of the algorithm on its website. 
4. The Allocation Platform shall determine the Marginal Price per direction based on the 
following criteria: 
(a) if the total quantity of Cross Zonal Capacity for which valid Bids have been submitted is 
lower than or equal to the relevant Offered Capacity for the relevant Auction, then the Marginal 
Price shall be zero; 
(b) if the total quantity of Cross Zonal Capacity for which valid Bids have been submitted 
exceeds the relevant Offered Capacity for the relevant Auction, the Marginal Price shall be set 




Appendix D Worked examples of contracting 
Contract decision making 
Consider a generator in France selling a 1 MW baseload CfD one month ahead for a given 
strike price sm, (m = FR, GB) where the subscript m indicates the country of the relevant 
market. Selling to a French buyer the contract would just be a simple CfD (sFR, pFR), where 
for the generator to be willing to sign the CfD, the strike price must be above the avoidable 
generating cost, c, so sFR > c. A baseload CfD pays the generator ∑h (sm - pmh) each day 
where pmh is the DAM hourly price in hour h, h = 1,2,..H, and H is the number of settlement 
periods in the day. The standard CfD requires the buyer facing a price below the strike price 
to pay the seller, and the seller facing a price above the strike price to make up the difference 
to the buyer. It removes all price risk from the generator, and similarly for a consumer 
wanting a constant rate of supply every hour, but this risk reduction likely comes at some cost 
to one or other party.  
In a world of perfect foresight, sm would be the average of the hourly prices, pm = 1/H 
∑h pmh, for the duration of the CfD (which for convenience we can take as a day to avoid 
extra notation). If consumers are more risk averse than generators, sm > Epm, making it 
doubly attractive for well-capitalised low-cost reliable generators to sell forward CfDs. 
Over the course of the day the DAM reference hourly price will vary and so will these 
payments between the parties. While the generator may be happy to run at a constant rate, the 
buyer will likely need to trade in the DAM to match his demand profile. Selling from BE to 
GB under SDAC would require a GB CfD (sGB, pGB) and a PTR in a month-ahead PTR 
auction at a price per MW of vFtG. At each end the DAM hourly prices pmh are determined by 
EUPHEMIA.  
We can now consider the various cases to see how well various hedging contracts can 
alleviate risk. In particular, the generator has to decide whether to generate on the day in each 
hour, h, depending on whether pFRh > or < c, and could nominate the PTR on IFA, but does 
not have to as un-nominated PTRs are automatically settled at the positive price difference.23 
The attraction of coupling is that it simplifies generation and purchase decisions. The 
decision to buy in GB is left to the buyer who submits a buy order into the DAM, while for 
the generator, the PTR becomes an FTR, and he just submits his offer to the DAM at 
avoidable cost, c. However, the fact that the PTR is an option means that it only offers 
insurance for flows from the generator to the consumer. To simplify, assume that (as is 
normally the case) FR on average exports to GB so that pGB > pFR on average. When pGhF > 
pFRh, the PTR from BE to GB is in the money and offsets the requirement to pay pGB - pFR, 
while if pGBh < pFR the PTR has zero value and does not offset the GB price risk.  
To probe the pricing of PTRs more carefully, consider the case of perfect foresight, 
where vFtG = 1/H ∑h Max(0, pGBh – pFRh) and vGtF = 1/H ∑h Max(0, pFRh – pGBh), where H is 
the number of hours (or periods). It is convenient to have an hourly value for PTRs, so define 
v+FtGh = Max(0, pGBh – pFRh), where the + sign is a reminder that it is only positive values that 




GtFh. The daily average 
 
23 The generator may prefer to generate even if the hourly price is below the apparent variable cost, as 
closing down and restarting are costly. We ignore these complications. 
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price difference is then 1/H ∑h(v+FtGh - v+GtFh) = vFtG – vGtF. Similarly, sGB – sBE gives a 
prediction of the expected daily average price differences, and in a well arbitraged forward 
market we would expect both to be close to each other. 
In the absence of perfect foresight, vFtG = 1/H E∑h v+FtGh + r, where E is the 
expectation operator, and r is the risk premium (positive or negative depending on the 
prevalence of buyers or sellers, and their risk aversion).  Pricing individual PTRs requires a 
forecast of hourly prices if flows reverse, and unfortunately the observable CfD strike prices 
in the two markets only give the daily averages. If flows are assured to be in only one 
direction, then matters simplify and the value of the PTR will be the (observable) difference 
in strike prices. As a reminder the notation is: 
c:  avoidable cost of generation, (this and all prices in €/MWh) 
sGB, sFR:   strike prices in GB or FR (in CfDs signed ahead of delivery) 
pGBh, pFRh: price in the SDAC DAM in GB or FR in hour h. 
pGB, pFR: daily average price in SDAC DAM 
vFtG, vGtF: price of a baseload PTR contract secured in a month-ahead PTR auction 
Case 1 Generation economic, pFR > c, and the generator informs the French System 
Operator that she will generate.  
Generator profit in each case from generating 1 MW in each hour is 
c) Selling to BE consumer hedged with CfD:  Profit = 1/H ∑h[(sFR – pFRh) + (pFRh – c)], 
where the first term is the profit on the CfD and the second is the profit from 
generating in each hour h. This simplifies to sFR – c. 
d) Selling to GB consumer hedged with a CfD in GB and buying a PTR from FR to GB 
at month ahead: Profit = 1/H ∑h [(sGB – pGBh) + {Max(0, pGBh - pFRh) - v+FtGh} + (pFRh 
– c)], where the second term {} is the profit from allowing the PTR to become an 
FTR. If in every hour pGBh > pFRh, profit simplifies to sGB - vFtG – c (without needing 
perfect foresight of the DAM prices).  
If these are perfectly arbitraged: 
sFR = sGB - vFtG. 
However, in most cases there will be hours of reverse flow and the term in {} will not 
cancel with the other terms. Suppose pGBh > pFRh in hours h* and pGBh < pFRh in hours h**, 
then profit will be  
1/H ∑h [sGB - vFtG – c] + 1/H ∑h* [(pGBh - pFRh) – (pGBh - pFRh)] - 1/H ∑h**(pGBh - pFRh). 
As before, in expectation 
sBE = sGB - vFtG + 1/H ∑h**(pFRh – pGBh). 
Generators pay less for the PTR but are left with residual price difference risk in some hours. 
 
Case 2 Generation uneconomic, pFR < c, generator does not run.  
Generator profit is 
e) Selling to BE consumer hedged with CfD: sFR –1/H ∑h pFRh, 
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f) Selling to GB consumer hedged with a CfD in GB, buying a PTR from BE to GB at 
month ahead, and receiving (pGBh - pFRh) in trading hours h*: 1/H ∑h [(sGB – pGBh - 
vFtG) + 1/H ∑h*( pGBh - pFRh). Note that if pFRh < c, profit in case c) is higher than in 
case a).  
As before, in expectation 
sFR –1/H ∑h pFRh = sGB - vFtG +1/H ∑h (pFRh – pGBh) - 1/H ∑h* (pFRh – pGBh) . 
The last two terms give 1/H ∑h**(pFRh – pGBh) as before, giving the same result and so we can 
ignore cases in which generators are not profitable.  
 
Other contracts for hedging across borders 
The problem with PTR (and FTR options) is they leave some price risk in forward markets, 
but this need not be the case, if there were an appetite for a new hedging contract. According 
to Meeus and Schittekatte (2018) the Nordic electricity market has its own CfDs which hedge 
price differences between the local area and the system price, called the ‘electricity price area 
price differentials’ (EPAD). “To hedge the price difference between two adjacent bidding 
areas with EPADs as an FTR would do, a combination of two EPAD contracts (a so-called 
EPAD Combos) needs to be acquired by a market player. Two EPAD Combos are required to 
cover the hedge ‘both ways’ for each interconnector between two bidding zones.” 
However, the problem with EPADs is that for many interconnectors, the average 
prices in their respective countries may be systematically different, as with the Continent 
where prices are typically below those in GB. In such cases there would likely be an excess 
of buyers in GB and sellers in FR, BE, NL (and the IEM generally), and as such there would 
need to be a counterparty to take on the basis risk.24 The natural counterparty is the 
interconnector owner, for which the right contract is a Transmission Right. This is apparently 
a reason by EPADs are very illiquid, even in a market where at least some cross-zonal flows 
may be more balanced. 
Clearly, if there were sufficient support, it would be possible to devise such CfDs 
across borders, with the advantage that as the standard CfD is an obligation, such CfDs could 
replicate the missing FTR obligations, without having to involve the interconnector owners. 
However, they would likely suffer from the illiquidity noted in the Nordic markets, and while 
avoiding the need for the agreement of interconnector owners, they do so at the risk of losing 
the natural counterparty to the basis risk. And if the interconnectors were to become involved 
in improving cross-border hedging, the simplest solution would be to have firm (obligated) 
FTRs. Indeed, it is clear from the lengthy discussions in the Nordic markets,25 that there is a 
reluctance to move from EPADs to  firm FTRs, so it would be perverse to introduce an 
inferior instrument that might block a superior one. There is also the obvious point that 
EPADs do not handle the allocation of interconnector capacity, for which the owners are the 
default counterparty, so they only solve part of the problem of cross-border trading.  
 
24 We are indebted to Andrew Claxton for this observation. 
25 E.g. see Financial Power Trading Nordreg Workshop on FCA GL given by Bernd Botzet, Market 
Manager, Financial Market, Nasdaq OMX Oslo ASA on 10 May 2016 
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